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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
WHAT YOU DO OR WHAT YOU SAY? AN EXAMINATION OF ANALYST
REACTIONS TO PROTOTYPICAL AND NON-PROTOTYPICAL CEOS
LINGUISTIC AND COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS

Non-prototypical CEOs are those that process different demographic characteristics
from a target reference group. In the US, a non-prototypical CEO is both white and male.
While the negative responses to non-prototypical leaders based on race and gender have
been well documented, we know less on what these leaders do that may influence biased
evaluations. In this dissertation I took an impression management view to examine
analysts’ evaluative bias (AEB) on prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs hiding
linguistic behaviors and competitive aggressiveness. Specifically, I examined hiding
linguistic behaviors on quarterly conference calls and two attributes of competitive
repertoire will be researched. Drawing from leadership categorization theory, competitive
dynamics: competitive volume and competitive complexity.
Using a matched sample of Fortune 500 CEOs from 2006-2012 of quarterly
conference calls and RavenPack action data I found support for difference in who exhibits
hiding linguistic behavior and how non-prototypical CEOs are evaluated differently based
on their competitive aggressive. This research seeks to take an impression management
look at how non-prototypical leaders are evaluated and narrow the gap between how CEOs
operate versus what they say to third party evaluators.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) serves as the face of multiple groups. In a
given hour the CEO may represent their industries, their countries, and their salient
demographics, and themselves (e.g., Love, Lim, & Bednar, 2017; Lovelace, Bundy,
Hambrick, & Pollock, 2018). In the presence of information asymmetries, the
amalgamation of these multiple identities are used to evaluate the health and actions of
their firm by external audiences. This includes evaluations from the media, investors,
analysts, social groups, and governments (e.g., Rindova, Pollock, & Hayward, 2006).
Therefore, CEOs uniquely must constantly manage their perceptions while facing
judgment from multiple audiences compared to other chief executives (Harrison et al.,
2020; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Managing perceptions are especially challenging when
their personal identities are not congruent with their professional identities (Avery et al.,
2016; Chung-Herrera & Lankau, 2005; Eagly & Karau, 2002).
The consequences of managing perceptions become more salient when the CEO
is non-prototypical. A non-prototypical CEO is a leader who possesses different
behavioral, psychological, or demographic features than their reference peer group.
Behaviorally, CEOs are seen as influential, trustworthy, judicial, and charismatic
(Platow, Haslam, Foody, & Grace, 2003). Psychologically, CEOs vary but tend to be
extraverted (e.g., Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009). Demographically, Western CEOs are
white/anglo and male (Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000; Ridgeway, 2003; Rosette,
Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008; Rudman, 1998). These prototypes are formed from a
shared cultural schema reflecting decades of CEOs from the most visible organizations
(Hogg 2001; Hogg & Terry, 2000). Anyone outside of this schema is deemed as a part of
1

the leader out-group, and heavily scrutinized (Hogg, 2001; Rosette & Livingston, 2012;
Tajfel, 1978). As a result, researchers have witnessed those outside of the race and gender
schema promoted less and their work scrutinized more (Avery et al., 2016; Cook &
Glass, 2014; Ryan & Haslam, 2005).
While most existing research on CEOs and other executives has focused on the
deep-level, behavioral and psychological differences on competitive actions and
organizational performance (e.g., Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015;
Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), surface-level, demographic differences
continues to be a factor in how leaders are evaluated, and ultimately underrepresented
(Livingston & Pearce, 2009; Morrison & Von Glinow, 1990; Ridgeway, 2003; Rosette &
Livingston, 2012; Rule & Ambady, 2008;Thomas & Gabarro, 1999).
Cognizant of their stigmatized identities (Pinel, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995;
Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998), non-prototypical CEOs may use impression
management for protection rather than self-promotion (Hewlin, 2003; Roberts, 2005).
Non-prototypical CEOs exercise their agency to influence the perceptions of others
(Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap; Goffman, 1959). Impression Management
research has allowed scholars to look at techniques used by people to manage others’
perceptions of them with dyadic and one-to-many audiences. Thus, researchers have seen
proactive techniques to reduce negative stigmas before they can begin (Gaertner &
Dovidio, 2014; Roberts, 2005). A way non-prototypical CEOs can manage their image is
by hiding their stigmatized identity. Hiding behaviors are those actions which
decategorizes individuals from their identities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2010), and refocuses
audience attention away from negative stereotypes.
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Alternatively, being a non-prototypical CEO can signal change and a broader
environmental scope that is better able to enact competitive actions (e.g., Andrevski,
Richard, Shaw, & Ferrier, 2014; Ocascio, 1997; Spence, 1973). Often this broadening of
scope leads to better organizational outcomes (e.g., Miller & del Carmen Triana, 2009).
However, we know very little on how competitive actions and repertoires are judged
when non-prototypical CEOs are at the helm. Despite organizational actions made,
negative stereotypes of the CEO may cause firms to be disproportionately punished by
external evaluators (e.g., Avery, McKay, & Volpone, 2016). As a result, there is a dual
model of judgment coming from what non-prototypical CEOs do versus what they say
compared to their prototypical counterparts.
This dissertation will address three main questions.
Multiple theories from organizational behavior and strategic management
behaviors will be integrated to answer these questions. Organizational behavior literature
on impression management (Arkin, Shepperd, Giacalone, & Rosenfeld, 1989) and
leadership categorization theory (Hogg & Terry, 2001) will inform communication
patterns of CEOs and subsequent reactions, respectively. Strategic management literature
on upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), and competitive
dynamics will inform the cognitive reasoning behind competitive actions (Ferrier, Smith,
& Grimm, 1999; Hughes-Morgan & Ferrier, 2014).
This dissertation will give a fine grain look to the motivations behind evaluations
of non-prototypical CEOs versus prototypical CEOs. In addition, it addresses
mechanisms to avoid negative evaluations based on race or gender.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 CEO Prototypicality
CEOs are the personification of their firm (Love et al., 2017). Their role is to
produce the best return for their stakeholders by establishing the short- and long-term
visions, motivating competitive actions (Wang, Holmes, Oh, & Zhu, 2015), leveraging
their network for competitive advantage (e.g., Pfeffer, 1981), and communicating with
various stakeholders regarding the health and direction for the firm (e.g., Pan,
McNamara, Lee, Haleblian, & Devers, 2018).
Performance of the firm is often over-attributed to the CEO, instead of other
situational factors like other competitors, regulations, and the overall environment
(Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). However,
CEOs deep-level demographics do impact competitive directions. Deep-level
demographics such as tenure, personality, education, and functional background are
unseen characteristics which influence information processing and decision making
(Carter & Phillips, 2017; Harrison, Price, & Bell, 1998; Harrison, Price, Gavin, Florey,
2002). Deep-level characteristics and its impact on competitive actions have been
researched through upper echelon theory (UET). UET’s states that competitive actions
can be predicted from the demographics of its top leaders, including the CEO, top
management team, and board of directors (Cho, Hambrick, & Chen, 1994; Finkelstein &
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick,
2007). Unlike the TMT or BoD, CEOs are constantly in the spotlight and serve as an
intangible asset for the firm (e.g., Offstein, Gynawali, & Cobb, 2005). Therefore, while
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competitive actions are decided by the TMT and BoD, the perception of competitive
actions decisions often rests on the shoulders of the CEO.
This perception led Wang and colleagues (2015) to conduct a meta-analysis to
find evidence of CEO characteristics predicting strategic actions. Wang’s team codified
over 300 actions. CEOs with a higher tenure are more focused on preserving their legacy
than pursuing risky investments like international acquisitions (Matta & Beamish, 2008).
On the other hand, narcissistic CEOs have the opposite proclivities and invest in risky
investments to maintain attention (Lovelace et al., 2018). Narcissistic CEOs also engage
in more corporate social responsibility (Chin, Hambrick, & Trevino, 2013; Gupta,
Nadkarni, & Mariam, 2018), mergers and acquisitions (Chan & Cheng, 2016), and
overall aggressive behavior (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Offstein & Gynwali, 2005;
Wieserma & Bantel, 1992) to increase attraction to themselves. Extraverted CEOs can
quickly adapt to environmental changes that positively impact firm performance
compared to those who are not extraverted (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). CEOs with
more education have a higher cognitive ability, which assists with their field of vision,
thus engaging in more competitive actions (Finkelstein, Cannella, & Hambrick, 2009;
Wally & Baum, 1994).
Surface-level characteristics, like race and gender, also impact competitive
actions. Women CEOs were found to engage less risky competitive actions compared to
men (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2015). However, women executives have more leverage
to enact strategic change when organizations are facing environmental uncertainty
(Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014). Consequently, Women CEOs see more success
in mitigating biases when they pursue unconventional projects (Owens et al., 2018). The

5

impact of CEOs' race on competitive actions has even less research, as most CEO studies
have focused on single industries with racially homogeneous populations (e.g., Hermann
& Nadkarni, 2013; Nadkarni & Hermann 2010). Like firms led by women, those with a
higher proportion of racial minority managers can find and execute competitive actions
for firms in fast moving environments (Andrevski, Richard, Shaw, & Ferrier, 2014). For
both women and racial minority CEOs, they have less access to resources to enact the
diverse policies they are often expected to enforce (McDonald & Westphal, 2013). This
dissertation will be the first, to my knowledge, that takes a fine-grained approach to view
how women and racial minority status impact competitive actions and subsequent
reactions.
Stakeholders receive CEO communication over various mediums including, but
not limited to press releases, interviews, annual shareholder letters, and quarterly analyst
calls. Each communication gives financial analysts, investors, journalists, governments,
and more material to base their analysis of the CEO and their firm (e.g., Mayhew, 2008).
Thus, evaluations of firms are not only based on the substantial competitive actions and
of the firm, but also by the symbolic communications put out by the CEO and other
executives. Consequently, their communication performances enable the firm to attract
resources to better implement competitive actions (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004;
Pfarrar, Pollock, & Rindova, 2010). Being a non-prototypical CEO carries an additional
burden to attracting resources because their performances are met with more scrutiny
(e.g., McDonald & Westphal, 2013; Ridgeway, 2003).
CEO prototypicality is the degree a CEO contains the same behavioral,
psychological, and demographic characteristics as CEOs in their reference groups.
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Evaluators use mental shortcuts to decipher if a CEO is competent or not based on their
past interactions. There are three benefits to using CEO prototypicality lens instead of a
race and gender lenses for this study: 1) It allows social psychology literature, leader
categorization theory, to inform reactions to CEOs (Hogg & Terry, 2000), 2) It allows
plasticity of CEOs beyond the “Think Manager, Think Male” (Schein, 2001) and “Think
Manager, Think White” (Gündemir, Homan, de Dreu, & van Vugt, 2014; Rosette et al.,
2008) paradigms, and 3) It allows other executive leadership positions, like CDOs and
CFOs, to be explored. CEO prototypicality is like, recently published, CEO atypicality
(Lovelace et al., 2021); however, CEO prototypicality is built upon leadership
categorization theory (Lord et al., 1984). Therefore, CEO prototypicality allows for this
dissertation and future researcher the theoretical lens to predict audience responses to
what they do and say.
Non-prototypical CEOs have the role of not only managing the perception of
themselves, but any negative stereotypes that come along with their social group
(Roberts, 2005). For example, Black and Hispanic people must combat the stereotype of
being lazy and unintelligent (Chung-Herrera & Lankau, 2005; Devine, 1989; JeanquartBarone, 1996; Roberts, 2005; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999; Tomkiewicz, Brener, & Esinhart,
1991), which is the opposite of leader perceptions of disciplined and highly competent
(Ridgeway, 2003). While women must balance their level of warmth displayed with their
level of competence displayed in order to avoid being perceived as an “ice queen”
(Oakley, 2000; Rudman & Glick, 2001). In short, non-prototypical CEOs must deal with
the cognitive dissonance and (un)conscious biases from others seeing them in their
position. Failure to manage these perceptions comes with undue blame, recourse, and
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lower performing stock markets (Carter & Philips, 2017; Cook & Glass, 2009; Hekman
et al, 2016). Moreover, many of these audiences will blame something other than race or
gender for their harsher evaluations (e.g., Avery et al., 2016).
The difficulties faced by women and minority CEOs can be understood through
social categorization theory (Hogg, 2001). Specifically, CEO prototypicality lends from
an offshoot of social categorization theory - leadership categorization theory (Hogg 2001;
Hogg & Terry, 2000). It contends evaluations of leadership effectiveness is based on
sociocognitive inputs and a shared cultural schema (e.g., Hogg & Terry, 2001).
Leadership categorization theory has the capabilities to move beyond upper echelon
theory that explains what competitive actions diverse executives engage in to how those
competitive actions and communications are perceived. It is the perception of these
actions and communications which ultimately determine the resources a firm obtains.
Evaluations of CEOs’ legitimacy are based on the perceptions the cognitive
schema formed by witnessing other CEOs (e.g., Lord, 1985; Lord, Foti, & DeVader,
1984). Leadership categorization theory states that individuals are evaluated against a
leadership prototype in the search for competence (Lord et al., 1984). Moreover, those
who do not fit the leader prototype are deemed as part of the outgroup, and often are
evaluated worse than prototypical leaders (e.g., Opina & Foody, 2009).
Deep-level characteristics of the prototypical leader possess four traits: influence,
trust, justice, and charisma (Platow, Haslam, Foody, & Grace, 2001). While leadership
categorization theory was based on internal, dyadic interactions, CEOs also must embody
influence, trust, justice, and charisma in their one-to-many interactions. Influence is
needed to obtain organizational resources and encourage internal and external parties to
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the vision which the CEO and the other executive leaders have (e.g., Grant, Hodge, &
Sinha, 2017). Trustworthiness is a byproduct of influence that is needed to exercise
competitive actions efficiently (c.f. Zona, Minoja, & Coda, 2013). Moreover, CEOs’ pay
is constantly judged as a conduit to justice (e.g., Jasso & Milgrom, 2001; Zajac &
Westphal, 1995). Last, CEOs perceived as charismatic are often lauded and given more
resources based than those seen as uncharismatic (Bass & Avolio, 1995; Fanelli &
Misangyi, 2006; Meindl & Thompson, 2005). Each of these four characteristics are based
on perceptions, formed over time, and exercised automatically. As a result, those who do
not possess the surface-level characteristics have difficulty with how they are perceived.
Surface-level characteristics of the prototypical leader in the US is white (ChungHerrera & Lankau, 2005; Rosette, Leonardelli, & Phillips, 2008), and male (Rudman &
Glick, 2001). The reinforcement of this prototype is seen in local, municipal, state, and
federal governments, as well as in corporate America (DiAngelo, 2018). Audiences often
infer deep-level leadership prototype characteristics by analyzing surface-level leadership
prototype characteristics (Ridgeway, 2003). Therefore, deviation from surface-level
prototype characteristics has resulted in disproportionate consequences for the nonprototypical leaders (e.g., Avery et al., 2016; Kanter, 1977; Lee & James, 2007).
Despite claims that surface-level, non-prototypical leaders are based on merit
(Carter & Philips, 2017) and not demographics, scholars have found that categorization
based off race is automatic and only deterred with conscious efforts (Wheeler & Fiske,
2005).
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2.2 Analysts’ Evaluative Bias
CEOs and their firms’ health are evaluated by many external parties. Financial
analysts are one of the most consequential external parties to a CEO’s tenure. Financial
analysts collect, process, and disseminate valuable information to their clients and the
public (Wiersema & Zhang, 2011). Despite information asymmetries between analysts
(Mayhew, 2008), their recommendations often provide novel insight into the company
they are evaluating. In short, financial analysts are not only predicting where a firm’s
stock price is headed, they are influencing where their stock price is headed (Clarkson et
al, 2015). Analysts’ Evaluative Bias (AEB) is the degree of positive or negative stock
evaluations in a comparative group. There are two components of AEB that are salient to
this research: Target price bias (AEB-TPB) and target price consensus (AEB – TPC).
AEB-Target price bias is the percentage a between a predicted stock price and the
actual stock price. Typically, TPB is optimistic as to gain favor with the focal firm
(Bradshaw, 2013; Mayhew, 2008). In addition, non-financial factors like analyst-CEO
similarity have been found to drive forecast errors (Becker et al, 2019). Therefore,
optimistic TPB has become expectant (Dechow & You, 2017).
AEB – Target price consensus is the average distance in which all financial
analysts agree on a certain stock price. Firms may be evaluated by only two financial
analysts and as much as thirty financial analysts. A wide TPC could indicate analysts
have varying pieces of information and are evaluating on multiple sources. A narrow
degree of consensus could indicate a herd-to-consensus mentality (Tamura, 2002).
Therefore, instead of staking their reputation on what information they have and the
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analysis they conducted, they would rely on the first analyst stock price towards their
evaluation. Non-prototypical CEOs are risky evaluating because their presence is rare in
publicly traded companies. Therefore, I predict financial analysts will rely more on what
other analysts say, in a herd mentality, instead of relying on their own information.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) focuses on analysts’ propensity to over critically analyze those
possessing non-prototypical characteristics:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those led
by non-prototypical CEOs will experience a negative bias in analysts’
reactions.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
led by non-prototypical CEOs will have a negative AEB – Target Price
Bias
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
led by non-prototypical CEOs will experience a higher amount of AEB
- Target Price Consensus.
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FIGURE 1. Relationship of Analysts’ Evaluative Bias on CEO Non-prototypicality

2.3 What CEOs Say
2.3.1 Impression Management
Prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs have agency in how they are presented
through impression management. Impression management (IM) are the behaviors
individuals and firms use to obtain the best outcome from their target (Goffman, 1959;
Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley, & Gilstrap, 2008; Highhouse, Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009).
Non- and prototypical CEOs use IM to proactively manage the perceptions of outside
evaluators. These behaviors are salient due to their highly visible positions (Leary &
Kowalski, 1990).
IM was originally described as a self-presentation measure (Goffman, 1959;
Ralston & Elsass, 1989), used to obtain jobs (Ferris & Judge, 1991; Fletcher, 1989;
Gilmore, Stevens, Harrell-Cook, & Ferris, 1999; Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan,
1995), receive favorable performance evaluations (Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & Dutton,
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1998; Ferris & Judge, 1991), and ultimately transition to opportunities outside of the firm
(Giacalone & Duhon, 1991; Giacalone & Knouse, 1989). While the genesis of IM
revealed novel insights regarding the content of dyadic, intra-firm communications, IM
has emerged as a theory used to explain behaviors amongst CEOs, firms, and different
demographic groups (Bolino et al., 2008; Rosenfeld, Giacalone, & Riordan, 1994).
CEOs are motivated to engage in impression management for themselves, their
firm, and their fellow CEOs (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Roberts, 2005; Highhouse,
Brooks, & Gregarus, 2009; McDonald & Westphal, 2011). There are many ways CEOs
use IM. Bolino and colleagues (2008) identified over 30 different types of IM behaviors
across the management field. Finance and accounting literatures have also identified
different IM behaviors by CEOs (e.g., Mathew & Ramsay, 2007). For example, CEOs
use concrete language during their quarterly conference calls to denote confidence in the
past performance and future expectations. These CEOs found that they had higher stock
returns compared to CEOs who used vague language (Pan et al., 2019). In addition,
CEOs who have presentations to investors highlighting future strategies have seen higher
stock returns (Mathew & Ramsay, 2007). The method of featuring a firm’s progress
matters too, as Grant, Hodge, and Sinha (2017) found that addressing financial analysts
from Twitter does not have the same impact as a call or presentation. Last, CEOs IM has
been extended to CEOs supporting each other in the media when their peers face personal
obstacles (Westphal, Park, McDonald, & Hayward, 2012). This is a point of contention
between prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs, and prototypical CEOs are less likely
to protect their peers in front of the media when confronted with personal issues
(Westphal et al., 2012).
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Thus, non-prototypical CEOs face additional motivations for engaging in IM.
Internally they are not receiving as much help from their white male top managers
(McDonald et al., 2018; McDonald & Westphal, 2013). Externally stakeholders are more
likely to blame them for low performance (Park & Westphal, 2013). Their IM efforts are
not just for self-presentation and presentation of the firm, but they are also looking for the
presentation of their ethnic groups (e.g., Hewlin, 2003; Hewlin, 2009; Roberts, 2005).
Non-prototypical CEOs are often depersonalized and have their competence and
character judged based on their surface-level characteristics (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Ridgeway,
2003). Moreover, their actions are under a microscope (Foschi, 2000; Kanter, 1977;
Ospina & Foldy, 2009); receiving harsher punishments than their prototypical
counterparts (e.g., Cook and Glass, 2014). Therefore, although both non- and prototypical
CEOs use IM, it does not mean that they use the same types of IM, nor are their
behaviors perceived the same by evaluators. On the contrary, white women are punished
for exhibiting agentic behaviors (Rudman, 1998), therefore many women leaders lean
into their communal side when exhibiting IM behaviors (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007).
Executive women revealed that it was their speech, not their technical competence which
led to their positions, even though their male counterparts thought their technical
competence was the reason for their ascendance (Ragins, Townsend, & Mattis, 1998). In
addition, minorities find themselves having to engage in behaviors to increase
organizational identification and reduce intergroup biases (cf. Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin,
2001; Hewlin, 2003).
Non-prototypical CEOs also must engage in social-identity based impression
management (SIM) to address the additional components which their competence and
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character are based on. “SIM is the process of strategically influencing others’
perceptions of one’s own social identity in order to form a desired impression. SIM
involves shaping perceptions of identity group affiliation, as well as communicating the
personal significance and emotional value one associates with such affiliations (Roberts,
2005: 694).”
2.3.2 Hiding Behaviors on Analysts’ Evaluative Bias.
While the existence, persistence, and consequences of prejudice has been
researched in organization have been long studied (e.g., Carter & Phillips, 2017;
Westphal 2013; 2018), minorities and other non-prototypical people have engaged in
behaviors to reduce becoming victims of biases.
Non-prototypical leaders reduce biases to engage in hiding behaviors. Hiding
behaviors are those actions which decategorizes individuals from their identities
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2010), and refocuses audience attention away from negative
stereotypes. These are proactive, bottom-up behaviors (Roberts, 2005) that people engage
to reduce categorization into a negatively stereotyped group and a form of SIM.
A common demonstration of hiding behaviors is with name changes to sound
more Anglo. Emily and Greg received more callbacks for job interviews compared to
Lakeisha and Jamal during a field experiment between two major cities (Bertrand &
Mullainathan, 2004). There are financial rewards for hiding ones' culture in their name
(Biavaschi, Giulietti, & Siddique, 2017). Therefore, studies are published on explaining
the intricacies and consequences of name Americanization for Greeks (Alatis, 1995),
Czechs (Janis, 1925), Chinese (Louie, 2008), and Polish immigrants (Kotlarz, 1963).
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This form of decategorizing the individual and recategorizing them as a part of another
group has seen positive impacts in the strategic management literature. Zhu, Shen, and
Hillman (2014) discovered when existing directors recategorized new, non-prototypical
directors by their shared interests the new non-prototypical directors’ tenures increased.
That is, by focusing on what the board members had in common instead of what made
them different allowed the non-prototypical CEO to be seen as a legitimate member of
the board.
While Zhu et al. (2014) highlighted the benefit of recategorization from a sponsor,
someone speaking on their behalf, recategorization is engaged by the non-prototypal
leader. Sometimes people suppress certain social identities - and they are not being
consistent with external standards of professional competence and character. Judgments
on competence and character happen automatically (Wheeler & Fiske, 2005), and are
difficult to change (Darly &Fazio, 1980; Snyder & Stukas, 1999). Therefore, nonprototypical leaders must increase their organizational identification in order to be
received as congruent to the firm and its goals (Boivie, Lang, McDonald, & Westphal,
2011).
Hiding allows internal and external firm evaluators to accept the CEO as a
legitimate and competent fixture. As hiding takes away the focus from surface-level
characteristics and refocuses on the state and status of the company. For example, a
quarterly conference call is an opportunity to speak directly to analysts regarding the
health and future directions of the firm. If a CEO allows their Chief Financial Officer
(CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), or Chief Legal Officer (CLO) to speak, then
analysts have moved their attention to the other members of the call with increased
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identification. Hiding is the process of a focal actor hiding their stigmatized traits to
deflect biases. Thus, analysts will have a more positive reaction to non-prototypical
CEOs.
Operationally, CEOs can hide by speaking less to outside evaluators (CEO Word
Dominance) and increasing identification by using plural first-person pronouns like we,
us, or our (CEO First-Person Predominance) (Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon, &
Grawsser, 2009; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
with non-prototypical CEOs are more likely to engage in hiding linguistic
behaviors in corporate communications.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Non-prototypical CEOs will have less word
prominence compared to prototypical CEOs in corporate
communications.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Non-prototypical CEOs will have less firstperson predominance compared to prototypical CEOs in corporate
communications.
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FIGURE 2.
FIGURE 2. Relationship of Analysts’ Evaluative Bias on CEO Non-prototypicality with
Operationalization Constructs

2.3.3 Interaction Between CEO Non-Prototypicality and Hiding Linguistic Behaviors
Non-prototypical CEOs who engage in hiding linguistic behaviors will shield
their stigmatized identities, and as a result, lessen the negative association with their
salient identities.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): That the greater use of non-prototypical CEOs hiding
linguistic behaviors, the lesser the negative association between AEB and
non-prototypical CEOs.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The lesser use of CEO word prominence, the lesser
the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
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Hypothesis 3b (H3b): that the lesser use of CEO first-person
predominance, the lesser the negative association between AEB and nonprototypical CEOs.
2.4 What CEOs Do
2.4.1 Competitive Aggressiveness on Analysts’ Evaluative Bias
Impression management not only comes in the form of what CEOs say, but also
what they do (Highhouse et al, 2009). A CEO can hide by relying less on their speech
and more on the competitive aggressiveness of their firm. That is, CEOs may have a
higher number of competitive actions (Competitive Volume) or a more complex
competitive repertoire (Competitive Complexity) to gain the attribution of dedication
from observers as seen with exemplification (Bolino & Turley, 1999; Jones & Pittman,
1982).
Each action is made to influence a target’s perceptions, be it a customer, a rival,
or other audiences. A firm’s competitive actions are not made in a vacuum nor without
certain motivational inputs. For example, General Motors (GM) decision to enter the
market of electric vehicles came with the awareness of what customers wanted in
features, what governments wanted in emissions tests, what their competitors’
competitive actions, and what financial analysts were expecting GM to respond to. Based
on their competitive perceptions, GM will move in a way that is most advantageous to
them at a given time. Competitive dynamics is the viewpoint that addresses how, when,
and how long competitive actions occur.
Competitive action repertoire takes an Austrian economics view (e.g., D’Aveni,
1994; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996) of strategy and views competitive actions as a
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dynamic process determined by several different factors (Ferrier, 2001). A firm’s
competitive repertoire is made up from multiple competitive actions (Miller & Chen,
2012) that is derived from a stream of decisions (Mintzberg, 1978).
Competitive action repertoire has been found to influence stock market returns
(Ferrier & Lee, 2002), stock market risk (Hughes-Morgan & Ferrier, 2014), and
profitability (Miller and Chen, 2012). Thus, it provides an additional avenue to address
the reaction to non-prototypical CEOs (e.g., Cook & Glass, 2009; Glass & Cook, 2017)
by their competitive moves instead of solely their demographic characteristics (Ferrier &
Lyon, 2004; Marchel, Barr, & Duhaime, 2011). As a result, competitive repertoires give a
fuller, more accurate view of competitive actions and subsequent reactions to prototypical
and non-prototypical CEOs.
Firms with more accurate perceptions of the market have better overall
performance because they can decipher opportunities better (Ferrier et al., 1999; Gary &
Wood, 2010; Gnyawali & Madhavan, 2001). The firm’s competitive repertoire serves as
a reflection of aggressiveness, competence, and skills of the CEOs (Offstein & Gnyawali,
2005). Moreover, competitive aggressiveness has been linked to top management team
heterogeneity, as firms with more diversity in terms of tenure, education, and functional
background have generally better performance (Hambrick et al., 1996; Hughes-Morgan,
2010). While we know about TMT heterogeneity and competitive aggressiveness, A nonprototypical CEO may also influence the capability to decipher opportunities because
their backgrounds & networks enable them to have a more robust scan of their
environment (D. Kolev et al., 2021; Hillman, 2002; Post & Byron, 2015) compared to
prototypical CEOs. In addition, non-prototypical CEOs may be influenced to engage in
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more aggressive actions to refocus evaluators on the firm instead of their negative
personal stereotypes and increase identification to the organization (Boivie, Lange,
McDonald, & Westphal, 2011; McDonald et al., 2018).
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those with nonprototypical CEOs appear to carry out more aggressive competitive action
repertoires.
2.4.1.1 Volume
There are four attributes to a competitive action repertoire: competitive volume,
competitive complexity, competitive inertia, and competitive non-conformity (Ferrier,
2001; Hughes-Morgan, 2018). Competitive volume and competitive complexity are two
of the most studied attributes and are the focus of this study. Competitive volume is the
number of competitive actions an organization takes in a given period (Ferrier, 2001;
Ferrier et al., 1999; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996). Competitively intense companies
can respond to increasing market demands in an efficient manner. Non-prototypical
CEOs are expected to be more competitively aggressive but may lack the resources to act
aggressively (Lord et al., 1984; McDonald, Keeves, & Westphal, 2018). However, nonprototypical CEOs are assumed to be more resilient in their efforts because of their
position in a highly coveted position as evidence (Carter & Phillips, 2017). Therefore, I
predict firms with non-prototypical CEOs will respond more aggressively in their firm’s
volume of actions compared to prototypical CEOs.
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those with
non-prototypical CEOs will carry out competitive-action repertoires with higher
levels of volume.
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2.4.1.2 Complexity
Competitive complexity is the extent to which a given uninterrupted series of
competitive action carried out by a firm consists of a wide (versus narrow) range of
actions of different types (Ferrier & Lee, 2002; Ferrier & Lyon, 2004). Non-prototypical
CEOs would be able to identify different environments that have different needs because
of their unique viewpoints (cf. O’Reilly & Williams, 1998). Therefore, non-prototypical
CEOs are more compelling and thought out in their repertoire. Moreover, their thought
processes are more likely to be challenged from their counterparts compared to
prototypical CEOs (e.g., Chatman, 2010; Cox, Lobel, & McLeod, 1991). Consequently,
the actions driven by non-prototypical CEOs should be thoughtful, intentional, and
complex.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those with
non-prototypical CEOs will carry out competitive action repertoires with higher
levels of complexity
Interaction Between CEO Non-Prototypicality and Competitive Aggressiveness on AEB
While the impact of competitive aggressiveness on actual performance has been
widely studied (see Miller & Chen, 2012 for review), financial performance has also been
operationalized through projected financial performance by financial analysts. AEB is
especially consequential for CEOs as their removal may hinge on these projected
expectations (Park et al, 2021; Wiersema & Zhang,2011).
Non-prototypical CEOs, have an extra burden of being aggressive to be in line
with their double standard of competence (Foschi, 2000). They do this by being
aggressive and different from their competitors. Taeuscher and colleges (2021) argued
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that in certain context, firms gain legitimacy by being different. Recently Parker and
colleagues (2018) supported this notion when they found support for women being able
to mitigate biases by pursuing unconventional projects. Therefore, I predict nonprototypical CEOs who are aggressive in their volume and complexity will result in a
positive AEB compared to their prototypical counterparts.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The more aggressive the competitive action
repertoires of non-prototypical CEOs, the lesser the negative association
between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): The greater the use of competitive volume, the lesser
the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): The greater the use of competitive complexity, the
lesser the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
3. METHOD
3.1 Research Setting
I used data from Fortune 500 companies from 2006 – 2012. Several archival data
sources were used to operationalize the constructs. Analyst Evaluative Bias (AEB) data
came from Thomas Reuters I/B/E/S, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and
EVENTUS via Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). Firm name and industry came
from WRDS Compustat, Fortune, and CNNMoney (modernly known as CNN Business).
CEO non-prototypicality data came from multiple sources. CEOs names, age, and
educational backgrounds came from COMPUSTAT via WRDS and S&P Capital IQ.
CEO’s race and gender data came from DiversityInc., Catalyst, The New CEOs: Women,
African American, Latino, and Asian American Leaders of Fortune 500
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Companies (Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2011), and personal online web searches. Finally,
supplemental background data came from LinkedIn and Bloomberg Business Profiles.
Firm data, including return on equity (ROE) and firm age were from COMPUSTAT.
Competitive action data came from RavenPak News Analytics (e.g., Connelly, Tihanyi,
Ketchen, Carnes, & Ferrier, 2017; Guo, Sengul, & Yu, 2018). Last, quarterly analyst call
transcripts were sourced from Seeking Alpha (n=1368).
The samples are matched firms from the Fortune 500 from 2006 - 2012. The
period reflects variations in the US economy. Thus, 2006-2012 allows for greater
generalizability for CEO linguistic hiding behaviors and competitive action
repertoires (Brunnermeier, 2009; Pan et al., 2018). The Fortune 500 contains the largest
and most highly visible companies in the U.S. Their total value accounts for 67% of the
revenue of the GDP (fortune.com/fortune500). Therefore, it is an influential sample to
gather data from.
The matched sample of racial and gender prototypical CEOs and non-prototypical
CEOs are based on their Fortune 500 rank, industry (four-digit SIC code), firm size, and
firm revenues (e.g., Chen, 1996; Ferrier et al., 1999; O’Farrell, Hitchens, & Moffatt,
1993). This was a two-step process. The first step was to identify organizations with nonprototypical CEOs, the second step is to match the closest firm ranked in the Fortune
500 with the same industry classification that has a prototypical CEO. For example,
Merck (Kenneth Frazer, non-prototypical CEO) was matched with Pfizer (Ian Reed,
prototypical CEO) and Avon (Sherilyn McCoy, non-prototypical CEO) was matched
with Estee Lauder (Fabrizio Freda, prototypical CEO). The matched firms changed year
over year based on yearly revenue changes. There was a total of 177 unique companies
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from 30 different industries (two-digit SIC) and 77 different sectors (four-digit SIC).
There were a total of 529 firm-year observations. Some observations were removed.
Twenty-eight observations were removed due to being a private insurance company, thus
not having quarterly analyst calls nor analyst target price estimates. Observations were
removed due to a CEO change in the given year, as competitive action data could not be
directly attributed to the CEO. Therefore, there were a total of 481 firmyear observations.
To explore the IM differences between prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs I
used two distinct domains of corporate activity: quarterly earnings calls and firm
competitive action repertoires. Quarterly earnings calls are an opportunity for executives
to speak directly with analysts on their firms’ earnings, goals, and foreseeable hindrances.
Although much information about a firm comes from their PR, media reports, and
government agencies, earnings calls offer novel information to make judgments on firms’
future performance (Chen & Matsumoto, 2006). Earnings calls are an unobtrusive
measure that have several benefits that survey responses do not have. They bypass
leader’s low response rates common with surveys (Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007; Cycyota & Harrison, 2006), result in less biases, and allow for observation within
CEOs’ environment. Moreover, they result in less response, interviewer (Duriau, Reger,
& Pfarrer, 2007; Woodrum, 1984), and reactance biases (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007;
Pan et al., 2018). Last, quarterly calls address a common concern with measurement of
psychological factors with data that is conducted on an annual basis (McKenny, Aguinis,
Short, & Anglin, 2018).
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The quarterly earnings call gives a firm the opportunity to discuss the firm’s prior
performance and future plans. It is also an opportunity to reduce information asymmetries
and allow investors to make more informed investment decisions (e.g., Mayew, 2008;
Pan et al., 2018; Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999). A quarterly investors call can be
understood in 3-3-3. There are three portions of the call, three different parties on the call,
and three representatives from the company on the call.
The three main company representatives on the call include the SVP of Investor
Relations, the Chief Financial Officer, and finally the Chief Executive Officer. Other
parties, such as the Chief Operating Officer, Chief Technology Officer, or Chief Legal
Officer may be on the call if they are deemed necessary by the firm. There are three
different parties on a call: 1) the company representatives, 2) the operator, and 3) the
analysts. A neutral telephone operator connects the call and delegates questions from the
analysts to the company leaders. Last, there are also bank analysts. They come from
various financial institutions and typically ask one question each per call.
The first portion of the call includes the SVP of investor relations starting call.
Second there is a prepared opening statement from the CEO or CFO concerning the past
performance and future directions. Last, there is a Q & A portion of the call directed by
the call’s operator. Although organizations can choose analysts who will ask questions
before the call begins, there are times that surprising, unsuspecting questions are asked
that the Chief Executives did not prepare for (Mahew, 2008). Therefore, most analysts
find utility in the latter portion of the call (Chen & Matsumoto, 2006).
There are three main portions of a quarterly earnings call: 1) the ground rules
given by the SVP of Investor Relations, 2) the summary of the quarter by the executive
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leaders, and 3) the question-and-answer portion with the investment analyst. The Q&A
portion has been given greater attention throughout the years in strategy research (Pan et
al., 2017), and has been used consistently in finance and accounting research (e.g., Chen
& Matsumoto, 2006; Mayew, 2008). The calls reduce informational asymmetries by
allowing external audiences to ask questions about the firm, but it is also a large
impression management for the firm, as firms determine the queue, who will ask
questions (Chen & Matsumoto, 2006). There has been evidence of firms
disproportionately allowing those with a bullish view to take place on the call; however,
there are still instances where firms are surprised by analyst questions (Kelly, 2003).
Therefore, it provides a great place to observe hiding linguistic behaviors.
3.2 Dependent Variables
3.2.1 Analysts’ Evaluative Bias
Analysts’ Evaluative Bias (AEB) was used to predict analyst reactions to hiding
linguistic behaviors and competitive action repertoires. Each firm has a different number
of analysts from financial organizations evaluating their performance. Smaller firms may
have two analysts, while larger firms may have 15 analysts. Dedicated analysts use firms’
competitive actions, communications, environmental factors, and financial cues to judge
how they believe a firm will do in a given quarter. Annual judgments are written in the
form of estimates, predictions of a firm's target price for the upcoming year. The earnings
expectations are housed in I/B/E/S. The consensus estimates are refined up until the
quarterly analyst call1. Therefore, it is a proximal indicator of reactions to hiding
linguistic behaviors and firm competitive actions.
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I measured AEB in two ways: target price bias and target price consensus. AEBtarget price bias is the percent difference between the average annual target price estimate
and the actual target price. AEB-target price bias is represented in Formula 1.
TPBit = (𝝻𝝻TPestit – TPactit)/ 𝝻𝝻TPestit

(1)

TPBit is the AEB-target price bias for firm i during time t. 𝝻𝝻TPestit is the analysts’ mean
target price estimates for firm i during time t. TPactit is the actual price of the stock
of i during time t. A higher number indicates a higher amount of bias. The sign
directionality of TPBit indicates whether the bias was positive or negative. Target price
consensus estimates from financial analysts are notoriously inaccurate and optimistic
(Stotz, 2017). As a result, overly pessimistic consensus dictates a lack of capabilities of
the firm and/or CEO.
AEB-target price consensus is the degree of target price estimate difference
between financial analysts (e.g., Abarbanell et al., 1995; Cooper et al., 2001; Dreman &
Berry, 1995) for a focal firm. I measured this using the coefficient of variation, which is
also known as relative standard deviation. It is defined as a...
“Statistical measure of the dispersion of data points in a data series around the
mean. . . .it is a useful statistic for comparing the degree of variation from one
data series to another, even if the means are drastically different from one another
(Hayes, 2021).”
The benefit of using the coefficient of variation is that it allows for standard
deviation comparisons between target price estimates of firms with high average stock
prices (e.g., $3000/share) with those of low average stock prices (e.g., $30/share) without
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having to account for total market capitalization. Therefore, the spreads between different
financial analysts target price estimations can be compared between firms. AEB-target
price consensus bias is represented in formula 2.
TPC it = -1(𝞼𝞼it/mit)
(2)
TPC it is the AEB-target price consensus. Where 𝞼𝞼it is the standard deviation of analysts

target price estimates for firm i during time t and mit is the average target price estimation
among the financial analysts. This value is expressed in a percentage. A higher number
indicates a high level of consensus, and thus a higher level of bias. A lower number
indicates a low level of consensus, and thus a lower level of bias. This definition of target
price consensus does vary from traditional forms (cf. Du & Budescu, 2018) of target
consensus, which defines target price consensus as the mean analyst estimate for a given
time period.
3.2.2 What CEOs Say
Transcripts from firms’ quarterly earnings conference calls between 2006 – 2012
were used to examine the relationship between linguistic hiding behaviors and AEB (cf.
Green, Jame, & Lock, 2014; Mayew, 2009; Pan, McNamara, Lee, Haleblian, & Devers,
2017). During data collection, the quarter included was based on the year starting in
January. For example, if a transcript title reflected the fiscal year was held in September
2005 but titled as Q1 2006, then the document was not analyzed. Instead, the call that
detailed information happening between January 2006 and March 2006 was analyzed and
categorized as Q1 2006. This way the call data of the CEO and the actions of the firm
were aligned. Moreover, some quarterly analysts are voluntary, albeit, normative.
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Therefore, data from the calls were averaged by year and years without any calls for all
four quarters were dropped from the sample.
3.2.2.1 CEO Word Dominance
Linguistic hiding behaviors in discourse are identified by two tendencies: the
proportion of first-person pronouns to first-person plural pronouns (CEO firstperson predominance) and the proportion of words used by the CEO to the total words
used during the Q&A portion of the call (CEO word dominance).
3.2.2.2. CEO First-Person Predominance
Percentage data of first-person singular pronouns (I, me, mine, my, myself) the
CEO used, divided by the percentage of those pronouns plus all first-person plural
pronouns (we, us, our, ours, ourselves) was calculated through Linguistic Inquiry and
Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker & King, 2015). First-person predominance indicates a
focus on the company and its constituents instead of the CEO him/herself
(e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
The second measure of linguistic hiding behavior is the total number of words the
CEO has spoken during the Q&A portion of the call/total words spoken during the call.
Extraverted leaders have been tied to speaking more (e.g., Mairesse et al., 2007).
Extraverted CEOs are known to also command more attention from their viewers.
However, extraversion, a personality measure, is derived from observed boisterous
behaviors. That is, extraversion is conceived from highly visible behaviors. Therefore,
CEOs trying the hide would not speak much during the entire conversation. This is a
measure of behavior, and not any underlying personality.
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3.2.3 What CEOs Do
Competitive action repertoires occur in alignment with a firm's strategies, goals,
and obstacles. Moreover, they do not exist independently of each other. A focal firm’s
actions may be dictated by moves from competitors, thus maintaining their market share
(e.g., Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001). For example, Silicon Valley was waged in a
patent war during the early 2010’s. Competitive moves increasingly became narrow,
involving two steps; Step 1: Acquire firm for their patents, Step 2: Use patents to file
lawsuits against fiercest competitors. The battle was most visible between Apple and
Samsung (Nicas, 2018). Competitive repertoire views competitive strategy as a repertoire
of micro competitive behaviors (Chen & Miller, 2012; Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier & Lee,
2002; Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Miller & Chen (1994, 1996, 1996a). Competitive repertoire
includes competitive volume and competitive complexity. Competitive volume and
competitive complexity are the most studied attributes of a firm’s competitive action
repertoire (for review see Chen & Miller, 2012).
Competitive actions came from RavenPack news articles. It is a database that
sources 22 different newswires like The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones Newswires and
codifies competitive actions (Guo, Sengul, & Yu, 2018). There are over 40,000 firms in
its database, including the firms that will be used in this study (Guo et al. 2018; Tweldt,
2016). The benefit of using RavenPack is that it is up to date in an increasingly fast paced
world and is faster than prior studies (e.g., Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1994; Chen, 2009).
Therefore, more industry actions are observed. RavenPack uses a patented algorithm to
classify articles into categories (Connelly et al., 2017; Lin, Mass, & Zhang, 2014). If a
company did not have any actions in a given year, then their sample was excluded from
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the dataset; therefore, there are a total of 289 yearly observations of competitive action
repertoire data. There were eight potential actions to consider for cross-industry analysis:
new product actions, capacity related actions, pricing actions, marketing actions,
acquisitions, strategic alliances, market expansion, and legal actions (Connelly et al.,
2017). Figure 3 describes the eight different actions, and how they are classified
in RavenPack.
FIGURE 3. Competitive Action Classification from RavenPack

3.2.3.1 Competitive Volume
Describes the gross number of actions a firm takes over a year (Ferrier, 2001;
Smith et al., 2001). For example, competitive volume would capture the sheer number of
competitive actions Samsung and Apple took during a defined period.
CVit=𝛴𝛴TAt

(3)

CVit is Competitive Volume for firm i at time t. 𝛴𝛴TAt is the summation of total competitive
actions at year t.
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3.2.3.2 Competitive Complexity
Describes the extent to which a repertoire of actions is composed of actions of
many different types (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lee, 2002). Competitive complexity is
the opposite of competitive simplicity which is a “tendency of firms to concentrate on
just a few central activities” (Miller & Chen, 1996, p. 419). For example, competitive
complexity would capture which firm is engaging in different types of actions. For
example, is Apple acquiring three firms or is Apple acquiring firms, cutting prices, and
introducing new hardware? The firm with the highest number of action types has a
higher complexity (Ferrier & Lyon, 2004; Miller & Chen, 1996). research has used a
Herfindahl-type index of competitive complexity. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) is a weighted diversity index that commonly describes how many different types
of actions are in a year. Recent research by Connelly and colleges (2017), found the
Shannon Index to be a more robust measure of diversity.
This study uses the same formula from Connelly et al., 2017:
CCit = − ∑ pi ln pi i=1
(4)
“Where pi is the proportion of competitive actions belonging to the competitive
action category of R total categories. This index ranges from a high of ln(R) when
all types of competitive actions are equally common and approaches zero as
actions become more concentrated (Connelly et al, 2017, p. 20).”
3.3 Independent Variables
CEO Non-Prototypicality. Non-prototypical CEOs are those that process different
demographic characteristics from a target reference group (cf. Ridgeway 2003;
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Van Kippenberg & Van Kippenberg, 2003). Therefore, CEOs were coded as nonprototypical (1) if they are not a white male. That is, if they were Black
American, Latino, Asian American, and/or a woman then they were categorized as nonprototypical. The demographic data came from COMPUSTAT, Execucomp, Bloomberg
Business Profiles, LinkedIn, DiversityInc., Catalyst, and personal web searches.
CEO race and gender was primarily collected from the appendix of The New
CEOs (Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2011). DiversityInc and Catalyst were also used to
cross-check women, African American, Latino, and Asian American
CEOs. DiversityInc is a news website dedicated to reporting news and compiling lists of
best companies for diversity. Their assessments are often touted on corporations'
Diversity webpages. Catalyst is a global nonprofit that focuses on building workplaces
that empower women. They work with over 800 companies and compile yearly lists of
the most powerful women in Corporate America (Catalyst.org). CEO gender data was
supplemented with data collected from CNNMoney. CEO race was coded in five
different categories: White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and American Indian
(e.g., Andrevski et al., 2014; Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2011). CEO gender will be
dummy coded as male (0) and female (1). White males are categorized as nonprototypical.
3.4 Control Variables
There are variables on the firm-, and CEO-level which must be accounted for to
address possible endogeneity. Firm age, like CEO age, is an indicator of increased
likelihood of repeat competitive actions (Wang et al., 2015). As the firm age, they fall
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into a routine based on past actions & successes (Lant, Millken, & Batra, 1992; Miller &
Chen, 1995; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2005).
CEO demographics such as age, education, and insider status may influence
competitive actions; therefore, they were controlled for (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007; Connelly et al., 2017; Foschi, 1989; Foschi, 2000; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996;
Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014).
CEO name, age, education, and insider status came from Execucomp and written
backgrounds provided on S&P Capital IQ. Each entry was double checked among
LinkedIn, Bloomberg Business Profiles.
CEO elite education background has been shown to influence external
perceptions in firm turnarounds (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014). Elite education was first
collected on S&P Capital IQ. Then a secondary search on Bloomberg Business Profiles,
LinkedIn, and personal web searches were conducted. Bloomberg Business Profiles
contain background information on top executives’ backgrounds, previous education, and
web searches. Elite schools (e.g. Harvard University, University of Texas - Austin,
University of Pennsylvania) were coded as (1). The list of elite schools are in Appendix
A. Elite education is a space where CEOs may have learned the same linguistic behaviors
and scenarios which to perform certain competitive action repertoires. CEOs were coded
as elite if their undergraduate or graduate degrees came from top universities. Honorary
doctorates and certificate courses were not counted towards education background.
CEO insider is the difference between when a CEO started their tenure as CEO
and when they started at the firm. If a CEO started their tenure at the same time they
started at the firm, then they were coded as an outsider (Chung, Rogers, Lubatkin, &
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Owers, 1987; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010). If the CEO was a founder, then
they were coded as an insider. Finally, if the CEO came from a firm under a different
name due to a merger or acquisition, then they were coded as an insider.
A count of questions asked (Questions asked) were used to account for
differences in quarterly analyst call length. This number was derived from counting the
number of call operator interruptions during the question-and-answer portion, as the
operator typically introduced each financial analyst before they asked their questions to
the CEO. Last, the number of analysts who submitted a target price estimate (Analyst
count) was controlled to account for variation in AEB.
3.5 Analysis
My dataset contains different industries with variable outcomes. Therefore, I used
a matched pairs design to account for the small sample while still being able to
emphasize causality. Pairs will be matched based on firm size, firm revenue, and four
digit sic-code. Matched-pair analysis imposes a high standard of rigor and does not
impose “causal logic inherent in regression analysis” (Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Natalia, &
Pratima Bansal, 2016, p. 1621). Therefore, a matched-pair design allows the independent
variables explain differences between firms with greater certainty compared to
unmatched sample design (e.g., Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas,
2002; Mallette, 1991; O’Connor et al., 2006; Schnatterly, 2003; Short and Toffel, 2010).
Consistent with prior match-pairs designs (e.g., Ferrier et al, 1999; Ortiz-deMandojana, 2016) surrounding competitive action repertoires, I use two-step ordinal least
squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity.
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The first stage will account for the industry, firm, and CEO control variables. The second
stage will account for CEO non-prototypicality.
4. RESULTS
The means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in Table 1. All
variance inflation factors (VIF) were below 10 (min VIF = 1.07, max VIF = 2.05), below
the threshold for multicollinearity of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Kuntner,
Nachtsheim, and Neter, 2004). There was a total of 177 unique companies from 30
different industries (two-digit SIC) and 77 different sectors (four-digit SIC). Each of the
OLS regressions were calculated using robust standard errors to account for
heteroscedasticity.
The results of the regression analyses are in Tables 2 - 9. Table 2 highlights the
differences between prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs in both their hiding
linguistic behaviors and competitive action repertoires. Table 3 presents the baseline
Analyst Evaluative Bias (AEB) between prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs on the
two dimensions: 1) Annual target price bias and 2) Target price consensus bias. Target
price consensus bias, measured by coefficient of variation, means there is a high (or low)
degree in valuation of the annual stock price for a given firm. High consensus indicates
high bias. Low consensus indicates low bias. Tables 4 and 5 presents AEB for hiding
linguistic behaviors for annual target price bias and target price consensus bias,
respectively. Tables 6 and 7 present AEB for competitive action repertoires. Last,
supplementary Table 8 and 9 present AEB direct effects without considering CEO nonprototypicality.

37

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics
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The models for Tables 4-7 present the control variables for Model 1. Models 2
and 3 present the main effect for the hiding linguistic behaviors or competitive repertoire
attributes. Models 4 and 5 present the interaction of the main effect with CEO nonprototypicality status.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
led by non-prototypical CEOs will experience a negative bias in analysts’
reactions. Hypothesis H1(a) predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs,
those led by non-prototypical CEOs will have a negative AEB – Target Price Bias. The
results, illustrated in Table 2, does support a positive target price for non-prototypical
CEOs (ꞵ = 1.05, p<.05). Thus, hypothesis 1(a) is not supported.
Hypothesis 1(b) predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
led by non-prototypical CEOs will experience a higher amount of target price
consensus. The target price consensus nonsignificant but did reflect more bias for nonprototypical CEOs. Therefore, hypothesis 1(b) is not supported, but is opposite of what I
predicted.
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TABLE 2. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias Between Prototypical and Non-Prototypical CEOs

In general, hypothesis 2 predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical
CEOs, those with non-prototypical CEOs are more likely to engage in hiding linguistic
behaviors in corporate communications. Hypothesis 2(a) predicted that non-prototypical
CEOs will have less word prominence compared to prototypical CEOs in corporate
communications. The results, illustrated in Table 3, does show a non-prototypical CEOs
speak less than prototypical CEOs, but the relationship was not significant (ꞵ = -1.87,
p=NS). Hypothesis 2(a) was not supported.
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TABLE 3. Behavioral Differences Between Prototypical and Non-Prototypical CEOs
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Hypothesis 2(b) predicted that non-prototypical CEOs will have less firstperson predominance compared to prototypical CEOs in corporate communications. The
results, illustrated in Table 3, does support a difference in the ratio of first person
pronouns (I, me) over third person pronouns (we, us) (ꞵ = -7.10, p<.05). Compared to
firms led by prototypical CEOs, those with non-prototypical CEOs are more likely to
engage in hiding linguistic behaviors in corporate communications. Therefore, hypothesis
2(b) is supported.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the greater use of non-prototypical CEOs hiding
linguistic behaviors, the lesser the negative association between CEO non-prototypicality
and AEB. Hypothesis 3(a) predicted that the lesser use of CEO word prominence, the
lesser the negative associated between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs. As detailed with
hypothesis 1, the positive, statistically significant association of non-prototypical CEOs
and AEB strengthens (ꞵ = 1.40, p<.05) when I account for CEO word prominence and
CEO first-person predominance (Table 4, Model 2). However, the interaction between
non-prototypical CEOs and hiding linguistic behaviors (Table 4, Models 3 & 5) are not
statistically significant.
Hypothesis 3(b) predicted that the lesser use of CEO first-person predominance,
the lesser the negative associated between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs. The results,
as illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, do not support this prediction. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is
not supported.
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TABLE 4. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias - Target Price Bias - Hiding Linguistic Behaviors
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
with non-prototypical CEOs appear to carry out more aggressive competitive action
repertoires. Hypothesis 4(a) predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs,
those with non-prototypical CEOs will carry out competitive-action repertoires with
higher levels of volume. The results, illustrated in Table 3, shows there is no discernible
difference between the volume of actions carried out by firms led by prototypical and
non-prototypical CEOs (ꞵ = -0.02, p=NS). Therefore, hypothesis 4(a) is not supported.
Hypothesis 4(b) predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those
with non-prototypical CEOs will carry out competitive action repertoires with higher
levels of complexity. The results, illustrated in Table 3, shows that there is no discernable
difference between the complexity of actions carried out by firms led by prototypical and
non-prototypical CEOs. Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the more aggressive the competitive action repertoires
of non-prototypical CEOs, the lesser the negative association between AEB and nonprototypical CEOs. Hypothesis 5(a) predicted that the greater the use of competitive
volume, the lesser the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
The results, illustrated in Table 6, Model 4, supports a positive interaction with nonprototypical CEOs and competitive volume on AEB for annual price target (ꞵ = 0.07,
p<.05). Such that the evaluation of non-prototypical CEOs strengthens with the more
competitive actions they engage in. Therefore, hypothesis 5(a) is supported. A margins
plot illustration of the interaction is demonstrated in Figure 4. Positive AEB-target price
bias for non-prototypical CEOs is magnified when they engage in higher competitive
volume compared to prototypical CEOs. That is, compared to prototypical CEOs, non-
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prototypical CEOs positive AEB-target price bias was driven by their actual competitive
volume.
Hypothesis 5(b) predicted that the greater the use of competitive
complexity, the lesser the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
The results, as illustrated in Table 6, Model 5, supports a positive interaction of nonprototypical CEOs and competitive complexity on AEB for annual price target (ꞵ = 3.11,
p<.05). The increased complexity of non-prototypical CEOs results in a positive annual
target price bias compared to prototypical CEOs. Target price consensus on target price
estimates does not support an interaction between competitive aggressiveness and nonprototypical CEOs. Nonetheless, hypothesis 5 is supported.
A margins plot illustration of the interaction is demonstrated in Figure 5. It shows,
compared to prototypical CEOs, non-prototypical CEOs positive AEB-target price bias is
based on increased competitive complexity.
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TABLE 5. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias - Target Price Consensus – Hiding Linguistic Behaviors
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TABLE 6. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias - Target Price Bias – Competitive Aggressiveness
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TABLE 7. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias - Target Price Consensus - Competitive Aggressiveness
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FIGURE 4. Marginal Effects of CEO Non-Prototypicality on Analyst Evaluative Bias
based on CEO’s Competitive Volume (95% Confidence Intervals)

FIGURE 5. Marginal Effects of CEO Non-Prototypicality on Analyst Evaluative Bias
based on CEO’s Competitive Complexity (95% Confidence Intervals)
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4.1 Supplemental Analysis
The focus of this dissertation is non-prototypical CEOs, which is conceptualized
and measured as the combination of women, Black, Hispanic/Latino, and Asian CEOs.
However, the behaviors and reactions of women CEOs may differ from the behaviors and
reactions of racially diverse CEOs. The dataset only includes three intersectional, that is,
racially diverse and gender diverse, CEOs. Therefore, the outcomes on AEB on nonprototypical CEOs may likely vary based on examining solely gender or solely race. The
following are selected findings based on particularistic prototypicality of race or gender.
I predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those led by nonprototypical CEOs will experience a negative bias in analysts’ reactions. Whereas
the aggregate, race or gender, measure of CEO non-prototypicality was not found to be
significant, non-prototypical CEOs based on race alone had a positive statistically
significant relationship with target price consensus (ꞵ = 4.07, p<.01) when accounting for
education, insider status, age, firm age, and annual ROE. However, non-prototypical
CEOs based on gender had a negative non-significant relationship with target price
consensus (ꞵ = -2.00, p=NS) when accounting for education, insider status, age, firm age,
and annual ROE. Therefore, these findings suggest that analysts evaluative bias critically
depends on the specific demographic dimension of non-prototypicality.
I predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those with nonprototypical CEOs are more likely to engage in hiding linguistic behaviors in corporate
communications. Both racially diverse CEOs and women CEOs do not have a discernible
difference in word prominence. However, racially diverse CEOS do use fewer firstperson pronouns (have less first-person predominance) compared to third person
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pronouns (-0.08, p<.01). This finding appears to be consistent with theory and partially
support hypothesis 2. However, the relationship for women CEOs on firstperson predominance is less than men CEOs, but the relationship is statistically nonsignificant (-0.024, p=NS)
I predicted that the greater use of non-prototypical CEOs hiding linguistic
behaviors, the lesser the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical CEOs.
While the aggregate measure of non-prototypicality did not find support, there is an
impact with women CEOs. Women CEOs experience a negative target price bias when
they use more first person pronouns compared to third person pronouns (ꞵ = -4.91,
p<.05). Moreover, AEB is high with target price consensus when women spoke more.
That is, the more women speak in quarterly calls, the stronger alignment of estimates for
their firm is compared to men (ꞵ = 31.79, p<.05).
I predicted that compared to firms led by prototypical CEOs, those with nonprototypical CEOs will carry out more aggressive competitive action repertoires. This
hypothesis was not supported. However, when separated by race and gender, Women
CEOs engage in less competitive volume compared to men CEOs (ꞵ = -3.27, p<.1). This
relationship was not found with racially diverse CEOs.
I predicted that the more aggressive the competitive action repertoires of nonprototypical CEOs, the lesser the negative association between AEB and non-prototypical
CEOs. Women CEOs were found to have more consensus on their target price when they
engaged in more competitive volume compared to men CEOs (ꞵ = 0.30, p<.05). While
certain hypotheses were not supported, separating results based on race and gender
provided rich insights.
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TABLE 8. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias - Target Price Bias – Direct Effects
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TABLE 9. Analysts’ Evaluative Bias - Target Price Consensus – Direct Effects
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Last, although not theorized, the direct effects of AEB without accounting for
non-prototypical CEOs are illustrated in Tables 8 and 9. Higher amounts of competitive
volume (ꞵ = 0.04, p<.05) and competitive complexity (ꞵ = 1.77, p<.05) results in
positive, statistically significant AEB (Table 8, Models 3 and 4). Moreover, higher levels
of competitive volume resulted in more target price consensus bias (ꞵ = 0.11, p<.05)
(Table 9, Model 3). The impact of hiding linguistic behaviors on AEB were all
statistically non-significant when excluding CEO non-prototypicality.
5. DISCUSSION
This dissertation addressed three main questions. First, relative to firms led by
prototypical CEOs, are firms led by non-prototypical CEOs evaluated by stock analysts
in biased ways? Second, do non-prototypical CEOs tend to use impression management
in corporate communication and competitive behaviors more than their prototypical
counterparts? Last, how do CEO non-prototypicality and impression management interact
to influence analyst evaluative bias?
The goal of this dissertation was to address how non-prototypical CEOs are
evaluated and the role of their agency to influence that evaluation. I matched prototypical
and non-prototypical Fortune 500 CEOs from 2006 – 2010 to account for market
fluctuations and endogeneity. Theoretically, I drew from leadership categorization theory,
competitive dynamics, impression management behaviors to address these questions. In
the end I found interesting, and unexpectant results.
Contrary to expectations, non-prototypical CEOs received a positive AEB-TPB
compared to their prototypical counterparts. That is, when accounting for education, age,
and insider status, non-prototypical CEOs received higher stock price expectations
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compared to prototypical CEOs. Prior research contradicts this finding. For example,
Cook and Glass (2009a) found that the appointment of black leaders to an executive
position (e.g., CEO, CMO, CFO) resulted in negative stock price returns. A further Cook
and Glass (2009b) study examining all racial minorities found support for negative stock
market reactions unless the firm was intentional in communicating a commitment to
diversity. This sentiment was echoed by Westphal and his colleagues (2018) when firmly
established the negative relationship between racial minority CEO appointment and stock
price (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2015; Dezsö &
Ross, 2012; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski, 2014).
However, the articles used cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as their dependent
variable, and not AEB. That is, what we know about third-party reactions to nonprototypical CEOs but this research is limited to the overall stock market reaction and not
the analysts’ predictions. The reason for the disconnect between AEB and CAR may be
due to information asymmetries. In addition, the presence of non-prototypical leaders
could signal health and innovation (Glass & Cook, 2009), which is attractive to analysts.
Last, analysts may view non-prototypical CEOs who make it into the upper echelons of
Fortune 500 companies with a halo and therefore overly competent (cf. Carter & Phillips,
2017; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), thus not incompetent like many articles have suggested
(e.g, Roberts, 2005). These results suggest that the type of external reaction deserves
more attention. This is especially salient given the impact of activist investors (c.f.
Ignatius, 2021) and social issues on non-prototypical CEO dismissal (Gupta, 2021).
Future research should focus on the how other audiences evaluate prototypical versus
non-prototypical leaders and subsequent consequences.
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Non-prototypical did engage in more hiding behaviors compared to their
prototypical counterparts. Specifically, non-prototypical CEOs used a higher proportion
of third-person pronouns compared to first person-pronouns. The purpose of hiding is to
deflect from negative stereotypes and redirect to a more positive area of the person or
firm, as not to trigger biases (Carter & Phillips, 2017). Social identity-based impression
management has the goal of not just self-preservation, but preservation of their various
identities (Roberts, 2005). I argue hiding behaviors is another form of SIM because the
goal of preservation for various identities do not change; however, the method in which
this goal is achieved does.
In a recent qualitative study of minority executives, a Latina executive expressed
hiding of her accent to reduce anticipatory biases of looking in-competent. In the same
study a Black male executive engaged in intentional behaviors to reduce the negative
stereotype of aggressive Black men (Cook & Glass, 2019).
Supplemental analysis found support of women CEOs receiving a negative AEVTPB when they use a greater first-pronoun predominance. Although, women CEOs did
not engage in hiding behaviors, they were punished with negative AEB-TPB if they used
more first-person pronouns. This supports the long-standing stereotype and expectation
of women as communal beings. Rudman (1998) presents this situation as a double-edged
sword in that Self-promotion increases perceptions for competence and hireability but
decreased social attraction ratings.
Surprisingly, I did not find statistical differences between non-prototypical CEOs
& prototypical CEOs use of competitive aggressiveness. In fact, when teased apart,
women CEOs did have less competitive volume. This may be due to an increased scope
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in information to consider with competitive actions (e.g., Chatman, 2010). In effect,
CEOs operate the same, no matter the prototypicality status, but they differ in how those
actions are evaluated.
Consequently, I found non-prototypical CEOs ratings were driven by high levels
of both attributes of competitive aggressiveness: Competitive volume and competitive
complexity. Even though non-prototypical CEOs exercised no discernable difference in
competitive actions with their prototypical CEOs counterparts, they were evaluated more
on their actual actions. Non-prototypical CEOs positive AEB were driven by their
competitive aggressiveness, whereas prototypical CEOs benefit from other forms of
evaluations.
The objectives of this study were partially met. Theoretically, this dissertation
introduced hiding behaviors as a construct that influences how people can be and are
evaluated by third party stakeholders. Hiding behaviors are those actions which
decategorizes individuals from their identities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2010), and refocuses
audience attention away from negative stereotypes. In addition, I introduced nonprototypicality as a construct worthy of examination in the behavioral strategy research
agenda. While my research focused on linguistic and competitive behaviors, future
research my also include hiding visual behaviors.
While most existing research on CEOs and other executives have focused on the
deep-level, behavioral and psychological differences on competitive actions and
organizational performance (e.g., Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015;
Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), surface-level, demographic differences
continue to be a factor in how leaders are evaluated (e.g., Wu et al., 2019). Prototypical
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CEOs enjoy the benefit of not being evaluated so heavily on competitive aggressiveness.
Furthermore, this research challenges attributing linguistic difference between CEOs to
personality, and instead focuses on managing expectations (e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick,
2007).
This research contributes to the nascent but growing literature of the impact of
CEOs on competitive actions (e.g., Wangrow et al., 2019) and partly answer the call to
Chen and Miller’s (2012) call to research how CEOs shape competitive behavior.
Moreover, this research invites scholars to examine non-prototypical CEO leadership on
competitive behaviors and subsequent AEB. CEOs are consequential their firm’s
evaluation and are necessary to look at independently from the top management team or
board of directors. Non-prototypicality based on race and gender is grossly understudied
even though their presence has an impact on for their firm is being evaluated.
6. IMPLICATIONS & LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations and implications to this research that should be
addressed in future studies. Specifically, adding dimensions to competitive
aggressiveness and hiding linguistic & visual behaviors to future studies. Last, the value
of missing data should be considered in future research.
Competitive Aggressiveness. This dissertation looked at just two of the four
attributes of competitive repertoire: competitive volume and competitive complexity.
Competitive inertia refers to the level of activity that a firm exhibits when altering its
competitive stance in terms of the number of market-oriented changes it makes in trying
to attract customers and outmaneuver competitors (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001;
Miller & Chen, 1994). As firms age, they engage in more inertial strategies, as they have
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their routines in place (Miller & Chen, 2012). Non-prototypical CEOs are expected to
engage in new and changing strategies. For example, the 2008 recession saw the largest
increase in non-prototypical CEOs in part to engage in new, growth inducing strategies
(Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2011). Therefore, the more non-prototypical the CEOs are, the
less inertial they should be. The impact of inertia on AEB-TPC & AEB-TPB should be
studied in addition to non-conformity.
Competitive non-conformity is the degree to which adopts strategies in their key
operations that are new and different from their competitors (Deephouse, 1999;
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Adopting the same strategy is a form of legitimacy as all
strategic actions look the same. However, as demonstrated earlier, legitimacy may look
different for prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs. This duality of legitimacy will be
looked at in future research.
Hiding Linguistic & Visual Behaviors. One of the observed, but not measured
hiding behaviors was delegation. During the quarterly calls, CEOs will sometimes
delegate responses to other members of their TMT. In addition, the genesis of this study
started with visual hiding behaviors. Hiding visual behaviors give non-prototypical CEOs
an opportunity to highlight their firm and not themselves via public relation photos and
annual shareholder letters.
The Value of Zero. One key limitation of this study was the value of zero and
missing data. Competitive action data was obtained from RavenPack and matched by
gvkey. Firms that did not have any competitive actions via RavenPack were dropped
from the sample, instead of logging their competitive actions as zero for the entire year.
More investigation is needed to determine how RavenPack treats firms that are now
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defunct and/or acquired before adding zeros to competitive volume and competitive
complexity.
The timing of the forecasts. Annual target prices are submitted throughout the
year, as the year progresses the more accurate forecasts become (Stickel, 1993). It is
possible, yet unobserved for this study, that firms lead by non-prototypical CEOs are
evaluated at a later date to ensure accuracy and decrease negative consequences for
inaccurate forecasts. This provides an avenue for research surrounding CEO attributes
and the timing of firm evaluations.
Personality and hiding behaviors. As mentioned, personality traits like narcissism
and extraversion measured from highly visible behaviors in strategy and finance research
(e.g., Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Green et al., 2014). Although, the focus of this
research is on the observed behaviors, the enactment of hiding behaviors may also be
dependent on personality measures. Future research should focus on the Big Five and its
relation to hiding linguistic behaviors and competitive aggressiveness.
In addition, the firm quarterly analyst calls were acquired from Seeking Alpha.
The sample data starts in 2006, only months before Seeking Alpha started collecting
quarterly call transcripts in 2005. The missing calls for firms should be checked against
S&P Capital IQ transcripts to ensure they were intentional about hosting or not hosting a
quarterly earnings call.
Generalizability. This research looked at Fortune 500 companies. They provided a
highly visible context, in which CEOs are motivated to engage in impression
management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Future research should focus on different
contexts and samples with one industry (cf. Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010) to explore the
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nuances and situations in which prototypical and non-prototypical CEOs are more likely
to engage in hiding behaviors.
Practical Implications. This research presents several practical implications for
CEOs and the financial analysts that evaluate and predict their performances. For nonprototypical CEOs, their evaluations are based upon what they do, in that their legitimacy
and positive reactions may be based off of having an aggressive competitive repertoire.
Financial analysts should include CEOs non-prototypical characteristics in their forecasts
to ensure complex evaluations are not based on the physical characteristics of one actor.
For this to happen, common databases within WRDS should include the race and
ethnicity of CEOs. In addition, financial analyst should also be cognizant of evaluating
women CEOs based on the communal stereotype of women instead of the agentic
stereotype of CEOs (Rudman, 1998). While suggestions for behavior modifications are
towards financial analysts, non-prototypical CEOs should be aware of the negative
consequences they may face when engaging in less hiding behaviors.
7. CONCLUSION
Are non-prototypical CEOs evaluated on what they do or what they say? The
answer was a bit of both. Non-prototypical CEOs are evaluated more off what they do in
terms of competitive aggressiveness. However, non-prototypical CEOs who are women
must use hiding linguistic behaviors to avoid being evaluated negatively. These outcomes
suggest more research is needed to fully understand how leaders flourished with their
growing representative roles.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Elite Schools from U.S. News (No particular order)
Harvard University
14. Cornell University
Stanford University
15. University of California - Los
Angeles
University of Chicago
16. University of North Carolina - Chapel
Hill
University of Pennsylvania
17. University of Texas - Austin
Massachusetts Institute of
18. Carnegie Mellon University
Technology
Northwestern University
19. Emory University
University of California - Berkeley
20. New York University
Yale University
21. Washington University in St. Louis
Dartmouth College
22. Georgetown University
Columbia University
23. Indiana University
University of Virginia
24. Vanderbilt University
Duke University
25. Rice University
University of Michigan - Ann
26. University of Notre Dame
Arbor

*Georgetown University, Rice University, and Indiana University were the only
institutions not listed as elite in Gomulya & Boeker (2014).
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